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Abstract. We examine interactions among explicit and implicit contracting practices for a sample
of 385 intermediaries in California fruit and vegetable markets. Explicit practices are measured
with an indicator for the existence of a formal contract, and with indicators for various contract
speciﬁcations (e.g., target delivery date, volume, acreage). Implicit practices are measured directly
with a question about the existence of an “implicit understanding,” and indirectly with questions
about the extent of informal involvement in farm-level decision making. Firms that manufacture
processed foods, and that grow in house a portion of their total farm input, are signiﬁcantly more
likely to report use of explicit and implicit contracting practices. Additionally, unobserved factors
that inﬂuence the use of explicit and implicit contracting are positively correlated. These ﬁndings
suggest a complementary relationship between formal and informal contracts.
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1Introduction
A number of scholars, including economists, lawyers, management scientists, and sociologists
have all observed that formal statements of contractual obligation often diﬀer substantially from
the actual terms of exchange. Llewellyn (1931, p. 736) was among the ﬁrst legal scholars to make
this point, arguing that, “The major importance of a legal contract is to provide a framework...
a framework highly adjustable, a framework which almost never accurately indicates real working
relations, but which aﬀords a rough indication around which such relations vary, an occasional
guide in case of doubt, and a norm of ultimate appeal when the relations cease in fact to work.”
It is relatively recent, however, that economists have focused their eﬀorts on modeling interactions
between explicit and implicit contracts. This work has, for the most part, found that the two
can either substitute or complement, depending on the context, and empirical conﬁrmation of this
ambiguity has begun to emerge (we review the relevant literature below).
The issue has become less one of, “do explicit and implicit contracts interact?” and more how do
they interact? We examine this question in the context of contracts for farm output that are used
by ﬁrst-level intermediaries of fruit, nut, and vegetable commodities in California. We conducted
a survey of 385 of these intermediaries to ask about their contracting practices. We describe the
survey protocol and data below, but Figure 0.1 summarizes key ﬁndings for the purpose of this
paper. Firms who process, rather than merely broker or market fresh produce, and ﬁrms who grow
some portion of their farm input in house, are signiﬁcantly more likely to report use of formal
contracts and to claim that their farmers’ actions are inﬂuenced to some degree by an “implicit
understanding.” This ﬁnding suggests a complementary relationship between explicit and implicit
contracting practices. The factors that are motivating particular kinds of intermediaries to use
formal contracting practices are also driving them to use informal contracting practices. Below, we
explore, and conﬁrm, the robustness of our results by considering other measures of explicit and
implicit contracting practices, and by controlling for various sources of heterogeneity.
Our data do not permit formal testing of why processors and ﬁrms who produce in house are so
much more inclined to combine formal and informal contracting practices, but we identify a number
of hypotheses. In particular, we argue that processors are able to identify relatively easy-to-measure
performance indicators on which a formal contract can be based, and that ﬁrms who grow in house
know better the production environment of their contractees. It is reasonable to expect that both
these characteristics serve to reduce the cost of writing a formal contract. Similarly, processing ﬁrms
arguably face greater costs from a coordination failure, and thus may beneﬁt more from investing
in a formal contractual apparatus. Our ﬁndings are therefore consistent with the notion that ﬁrms
adopt formal contracting in response to a cost-beneﬁt calculus from doing so, and that for those
who do, formal contracts then provide a foundation on which informal, or relational, incentives can
more easily be built.
In what follows, we brieﬂy review and summarize the relevant extant literature on formal and
informal contracting. We then provide more detail on the speciﬁc environment where we study this





















































































Graphs by Product Grown in House
Figure 0.1. Explicit and implicit contracting practices by ﬁrms that broker and
market fresh produce versus those that manufacture processed foods, and by ﬁrms
that do not grow any portion of their farm input in house versus those that do.
Related Literature
Preliminaries. A number of economists and management scientists have examined the rational,
calculative origins of relational governance, with expectations of future interactions enforcing co-
operation in the present. These economic models focus on cooperation that is driven purely by
monetary beneﬁts from future interactions rather than by social norms (such as reciprocity and gen-
uine trustworthiness). In these models, implicit or informal or relational contracts are self-enforced
through rewards and punishments in a repeated interaction (Bull, 1987; Macleod and Malcomson,
1989; Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy, 1994; Pearce and Stacchetti, 1998; Schmidt and Schnitzer, 1995;
Levin, 2003; Macleod, 2006). The self-enforcement is usually via trigger strategies, where reneging
on the implicit agreement by one of the contracting parties results in the other party breaking oﬀ
the relational contract with the party who reneged. For a relational contract to be self-enforcing the
value of the future relationship must be suﬃciently large to outweigh the short-run beneﬁts from
reneging. In contrast to formal contracts that are conditioned on objective measures, relational
contracts can be conditioned on contingencies that are observed only by the contracting parties and
can specify actions that are prohibitively costly to specify in a formal contract. A relational contract
thus allows the parties to utilize new and non-contractible information as it becomes available.
By contrast to these selﬁsh motivations, some economists have emphasized intrinsic motivations
such as good will and reciprocity. Fehr, Gächter, and Kirchsteiger (1997) emphasize the tendency
3of people to reciprocate favors and punish unfair behavior as the main contributing factors to the
enforcement of contracts. Fehr, Gächter, and Kirchsteiger (1997, p. 836) present experimental
data that suggests that “reciprocal motivations have a robust and very powerful impact on the
enforcement of contracts.”
Chen (2000) emphasizes that people have a tendency to keep promises that are a result of “social
conventions, norms, rules of thumb, or any mutually understood signals,” and demonstrates that
when contracting parties have some desire to keep promises they may choose to write an incomplete
contract even though complete contracts are available.
The sociology literature (e.g., Macaulay, 1963; Bradach and Eccles, 1989) identiﬁes socially de-
rived norms and social ties, that emerge from prior transactions, as the main forces shaping repeated
exchanges. These studies point out that ﬁrms are embedded in a network of social relations with
other parties and that ﬁrms form such relations in response to marker failures. Trust is considered
a trait that becomes embedded in a particular exchange relation. Using social processes, such as
mutuality and cooperation, and the resulting norms, relational governance may mitigate various
exchange hazards. These social aspects of repeated interactions have also been addressed by the
management literature. The latter identiﬁes and examines norms of ﬂexibility, information sharing,
and commitment as factors that may mitigate exchange hazards (e.g., Adler, 2001; Blumberg, 2001).
Formalizing Interaction Between Explicit and Implicit Contracts. Interactions between
formal contracts and relational governance has been at the center stage of the economics, man-
agement, and sociology literatures on relational governance. Some empirical studies and formal
treatments of the subject point toward complementarity between formal contracts and relational
governance, i.e. the two re-enforce each other making their joint use more eﬀective. Other studies
support the substitution view by demonstrating that the mere feasibility of formal contracts may
hinder the use of implicit self-enforcing arrangements or social norms. Finally, the third category of
studies generates mixed results with formal contracts and relational governance being complemen-
tary under some circumstances and substitutable under others. In what follows we begin with an
overview of selected (formal and informal) treatments of the interaction between formal contracts
and relational governance in the economics literature. This is followed by the contributions in the
management and sociology literatures.
Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (1994), Pearce and Stacchetti (1998), and Schmidt and Schnitzer
(1995) independently study interactions between explicit and implicit contracts and demonstrate
that when available objective performance measures are imperfect implicit contracts may be valu-
able. Implicit contracts can be sustained when the principal’s net beneﬁts from abiding by the
informal agreement outweigh the short-run gains from reneging on the implicit contract. Explicit
contract aﬀects the principal’s net beneﬁts from sticking to the informal agreement through two
channels; it alters the long-run gross beneﬁts from abiding by the informal agreement and it changes
the principal’s fallback position. When the objective performance measure is suﬃciently close to
perfect, the ﬁrm’s fallback position after reneging on an implicit contract is very attractive. As
a result, the use of implicit contracts, either in addition or instead of explicit contracts, becomes
infeasible. Thus, explicit and implicit contracts are substitutes when “almost perfect” objective
4performance measures are available (Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy, 1994). On the other hand, when
an option of writing a formal contract does not aﬀect the worst possible punishment equilibrium
and reduces the agent’s gain from a deviation, feasibility of an explicit contract enlarges the set of
actions implementable via an implicit contract (Schmidt and Schnitzer, 1995). Thus, explicit and
implicit contracts can be complementary.
Itoh and Morita (2006) formalize arguments in Klein and Murphy (1988,1997) and Klein (1996,2000)
by examining a hold-up problem in a repeated buyer-seller relationship where in each period the
seller makes a relationship-speciﬁc investment that aﬀects both the good’s value to the buyer and
the good’s value in the alternative use. Itoh and Morita (2006) ﬁnd that under certain condition
“formal contracting plays a complementary role of relaxing the self-enforceability condition for in-
formal agreements.” As a result, formal contracts may improve eﬃciency even in situations where
they don’t have value in a static setting. Under alternative conditions, it is optimal not to write a
formal contract but to rely entirely on a relational contract.
Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (2006) develop a model of repeated contracts that move decision
rights across ﬁrm boundaries. In their model, governance structure (or allocation of decision rights)
aﬀects adaptation as uncertainty of the economic environment is resolved. Allocation of decision
rights via explicit contracts also aﬀects the set of self-enforceable arrangements. The authors ﬁnd
that the decision rights should be allocated to the ﬁrm that has the smallest maximum temptation
to renege on the implicit contract.
A number of authors have suggested that formal contracts that rely on incentives and punish-
ments may signal absence of expectations of reciprocity (e.g., Frey, 1997; Fehr and Gächter, 2001).
Some argue that explicit incentives may transform a good-will based relationship into a monetized
relationship which is governed by selﬁsh considerations rather than good will, reciprocity and other
intrinsic motivations (Frey and Jegen, 2001). Formal contracts may also signal distrust of the con-
tracting counterpart and by undermining trust discourage voluntary cooperation (Fehr and Gächter,
2001; Falk and Kosfeld, 2004). This substitution eﬀect, which has been coined in the economics
literature as “motivation crowding out” (Frey, 1997), has received a considerable amount of support
from experimental data (see below).
The interaction between relational governance and formal contracts has also received considerable
attention in the ﬁeld of management. A number of authors view formal contracts as a more costly
substitute for relational governance. Gulati (1995, p. 93) argues that contracts and trust function
as substitutes: “...trust avoids contracting costs, lowers the need for monitoring, and facilitates
contractual adaptation. Trust counteracts fears of opportunistic behavior and as a result, is likely
to limit the transaction costs associated with an exchange... In other words, trust can substi-
tute for hierarchical contracts in many exchanges...” Similarly, Dyer and Singh (1998) argue that
informal self-enforcing agreements which rely on trust and reputation ‘often supplant’ the formal
controls characteristic of formal contracts. Sitkin and Roth (1993) argue that legalistic remedies
often undermine the “interpersonal foundations of a relationship” because they result in substitution
of formal requirements for an individual’s ‘good will’. In contrast, Poppo and Zenger (2002) write,
5“Rather than hindering or substituting for relational governance, well-speciﬁed contracts may actu-
ally promote more cooperative, long-term, trusting exchange relationships. Well-speciﬁed contracts
narrow the domain and severity of risk to which an exchange is exposed and thereby encourage
cooperation and trust. The continuity and cooperation encouraged by relational governance may
generate contractual reﬁnements that further support greater cooperation.”
The sociology literature has strongly argued that repeated interactions build up trust and de-
crease reliance on formal contracts (e.g., Macaulay, 1963; Bradach and Eccles, 1989). These studies
suggest that trust and other social norms are frequently more eﬀective in achieving preferred out-
comes than formal contracts. They argue that relational governance is based mainly on trust. By
signaling distrust of a contractual partner formal contracts frequently undermine the contracting
parties’ ability to develop relational governance. Thus, this literature postulates that social norms
and formal contracts are substitutes. Either relational governance eliminates the need for formal
contracts and vice versa, or formal contracts directly hinder the formation of relational governance.
For example, Macaulay (1963, p. 64) writes that “detailed negotiated contracts can get in the way
of creating good exchange relationships between business units.” He further argues that some ﬁrms
may be reluctant to use a complex contract because it “...indicates a lack of trust and blunts the
demands of friendship, turning a cooperative venture into an antagonistic horse trade.”
Empirical Study of Interactions between Explicit and Implicit Contracts. Recently, a
number of researchers have used naturally occurring data and surveys to examine the relationship
between repeated interactions, the form of formal contractual arrangements and relational gover-
nance. Rather than presenting an exhaustive review of this literature we focus on the papers that
are most pertinent to the present study.
Gulati (1995) examines factors that explain the choice between equity and non-equity inter-ﬁrm
strategic alliances involving exchange, sharing, and co-development in the biopharmaceutical, new
materials, and automotive economic sectors in the United States, Europe, and Japan during the
period of 1970-1989. He presents evidence that repeated interactions breed trust through famil-
iarity and make reliance on formal equity based alliances less likely. The author argues that ﬁrms
“substitute trust for contractual safeguards in their repeated alliances.” Similarly, Gulati and Singh
(1998) ﬁnd that repeated interactions diminish the use of hierarchical controls in alliances.
Banerjee and Duﬂo (2000) examine the Indian customized software industry and ﬁnd that re-
peated contracting does not have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the choice between ﬁxed-price and cost-plus
contracts. In contrast, the contracting ﬁrm’s age plays an important role in determining the con-
tractual outcome; young ﬁrms are signiﬁcantly more likely to enter ﬁxed-price contracts (which are
more explicit and rely less on ex post bargaining).
Poppo and Zenger (2002) use survey data on outsourcing relationships in information services
to test whether relational governance and formal contracts are complements or substitutes. The
authors ﬁnd that increases in the level of relational governance were associated with greater levels
of complexity in formal contracts. They also ﬁnd strong evidence that reliance on relational norms
is increasing in the longevity of the relationship between the contracting parties.
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between repeated interactions and the form of contractual arrangements between oil and gas compa-
nies and independent drillers. The oil and gas companies tend to rely on two types of contracts with
independent drillers; detailed ﬁxed-price contracts and simpler and more ﬂexible cost-plus contracts.
The authors argue that the eﬀects of repeated interaction on incentive problems and contracting
costs are key determinants of the relationship between the prior history of interactions and the opti-
mal contract form. Repeated interactions mitigate incentive problems and lower contracting costs.
When the former eﬀect dominates, repeated interaction favors low-powered cost-plus contracts. In
the opposite case (when improvement in incentives is relatively unimportant compared to the sav-
ings in contracting costs), the contracting parties prefer high-powered and more detailed ﬁxed price
contracts. The authors present empirical evidence that companies with a longer history of interac-
tions are more likely to use cost-plus contracts, i.e. repeated interaction and formal high-powered
contracts are substitutes. The authors also ﬁnd that cost-plus contracts are more likely when there
is relatively large ex ante uncertainty about the economic environment (“complex” projects), when
the oil-company is relatively large, and when the driller is relatively small.
Kalnins and Mayer (2004) examine contractual relationships of a U.S. information technology (IT)
services ﬁrm. They analyze choice between three types of contracts; ﬁxed-price, cost-plus and cost-
plus with a cap contracts. Similarly to Corts and Singh (2004), Kalnins and Mayer (2004) ﬁnd that
the IT services ﬁrm tends to enter into lower-powered cost-plus contracts with contracting partners
that have a relatively more extensive history of procuring services from the IT services ﬁrm. That is,
they discover that repeated interaction and formal ﬁxed-price contracts are substitutes. The authors
also ﬁnd that the ﬁrm was more likely to enter into low-powered contracts when ex ante uncertainty
regarding costs and speciﬁcations of the project (“complexity” of the project) was relatively large
and when costs of measuring ex post quality (measured by the availability of an inexpensive test to
verify ex post quality) were relatively large.
Ryall and Sampson (2003) analyze joint technology contracts in the telecommunications equip-
ment industry. They examine how contract detail, formal monitoring provisions and formal penalties
vary according to whether ﬁrms have prior exchange experience. They ﬁnd strong empirical evi-
dence for complementarity between formal and relational contracts; contracts become more detailed
and use penalty clauses more frequently when at least one of the ﬁrms has prior deal experience.
These eﬀects are stronger when the contracting ﬁrms have prior experience with each other.
Fehr and Gächter (2001) present experimental evidence indicating that incentive contracts may
undermine voluntary cooperation. In their experiments, “the undermining eﬀect is so strong that
the incentive contracts are less eﬃcient than contracts without any incentives.” In the experiments
conducted by Gächter, Kessler, and Konigstein (2007) experiencing incentive contracts reduces vol-
untary cooperation even after incentives are abandoned. Their experimental evidence also indicates
that implicit incentives considerably increase voluntary cooperation and make explicit incentives
redundant. In contrast, Lazzarini, Miller, and Zenger (2004) demonstrate with experimental data
that incomplete contracts facilitate the self-enforcement of noncontractible dimensions. They ﬁnd
evidence of reciprocity as an enforcement mechanism. However, they ﬁnd no evidence that contracts
7crowd out the reciprocity eﬀect and hence substitute for social norms. The authors conclude that
“low-cost contracts are important mechanisms to support cooperation when it is not very likely that
parties will continue transacting in future periods” Lazzarini, Miller, and Zenger (2004, p. 290).
Malhotra and Murnighan (2002) present experimental evidence on the negative eﬀect of contracts
on trust. Bohnet, Frey, and Huck (2001) provide theoretical arguments and experimental evidence
that demonstrates that legal rules have a nonmonotonic eﬀect on behavior. Trustworthiness is
“crowded in” with weak and “crowded out” with medium enforcement probabilities.
Repeated Contractual Relations and Learning. In addition to the factors outlined above
there is another channel through which repeated interactions aﬀect the contractual form. Mayer and
Argyres (2004) and Argyres, Bercovitz, and Mayer (2007) argue that through repeated interactions
ﬁrms gain experience in drafting more eﬀective contracts which, in turn, changes the form of optimal
contracts. Mayer and Argyres (2004) examine evolution of contract terms between the same two
partners in the personal computer industry. They ﬁnd that the structure of these contracts has been
becoming more “complete” over time and that these changes are mainly attributable to the learning
by the parties of how to eﬃciently govern the projects through contracts. The authors also ﬁnd that
the contracting parties have relied on formal contracts “as their main repository for learning, rather
than relying exclusively on oral communications or memos that are much less enforceable, legally”
and interpret this result as evidence that contracts “continued to play a central governance role in
the relationship, independent of whether other relationship-support mechanisms (such as trust or
reputation eﬀects) became more important in the relationship, over time”. The authors also present
evidence that trust between the contracting parties has increased over time. Their results, thus,
suggest that through the eﬀect of learning formal contracts and trust are complementary.
Similarly to Mayer and Argyres (2004), Argyres, Bercovitz, and Mayer (2007) ﬁnd that learning
leads to a positive relationship between repeated interaction and more detailed contracts. The
authors focus on two groups of contractual terms; deal description and contingency planning. They
demonstrate that a more extensive prior interaction leads to richer formal contracts in terms of
contingency planning. Contractual task description is not, however, aﬀected by prior relationships
with a speciﬁc partner.
In the next section, we describe our data and approaches for measuring explicit and implicit
contracting practices. The subsequent section presents results.
Data
Our data come from a 1999 survey of ﬁrst-level handlers of fruit, vegetable, and nut commodi-
ties in California. Data from a pilot study for our survey instrument are reported in Hueth et al.
(1999).
1 The California Department of Food and Agriculture’s Market Enforcement Branch li-
censes all parties who contract for, handle, or purchase agricultural commodities (for details see
http://www.cdfa.ca.gov/mkt/meb/). In 1999 there were 6,660 licensees. We sampled randomly
from the licensee population and phone screened 1,738 potential survey respondents. Our screening
1The survey instrument, variable descriptions, and data are available for public use at
http://www.aae.wisc.edu/hueth/calag.zip.
8instrument elicited the commodities handled, ordered by volume marketed, and asked respondents
to verify that they work with independent growers. This information allowed us to select survey
respondents that both handled fruit, vegetable, or nut commodities, and that contracted with or
purchased from independent growers. Of the screened ﬁrms, 36 percent were in our population of
interest, 5 percent were second handlers, 9 percent grew their own product and did not procure any
commodity from external growers, and the remainder either did not handle fruit, vegetables, or nuts
(25 percent), refused to respond (4 percent), or could not be contacted (20 percent). Of the 630
ﬁrms in our population, each was sent a mail survey asking for information about their contracting
practices for their largest-volume product (identiﬁed from the initial phone screen). We received
385 completed surveys, or a 61 percent response rate.
Table 1 summarizes the unique commodities and locations represented in our sample. Commodity
groups are deﬁned and used to control for heterogeneity in contracting practices that is speciﬁc to
a given crop type. There are a variety of ways potentially to group speciﬁc commodities. The
grouping we use reﬂects diﬀerences in planning horizon with respect to crop choice. In our survey,
we asked contractors the location(s) of their contract growers for the given commodity, allowing
multiple selections among the Sacramento, San Joaquin, and Imperial Vallyes; the Central Coast,
Mexico, “elsewhere in California,” and “Other.” From thes (possibly multile) selections, we deﬁne
8 location indicators from those who claimed to contract: only with growers in the Central Valley
(San Joaquin and Sacramento Valleys); only with growers in either the San Joaquin, Sacramento,
or Imperial Valleys; only with growers in Mexico; only with growers in the Central Coast; with
growers in three or more locations (Multiple Locations), and Other. Table 1 reports the frequency
distribution of respondents by these location indicators and the commodity-group indicators deﬁned
in the previous table.
There are at least three ways in which our data diﬀer from data used in previous studies of
contract choice. First, much of the previous empirical work has focused on settings with well-
deﬁned discrete contract types (e.g., cost-plus vs. ﬁxed price; share-rent vs. cash rent). There
is not a well established taxonomy of agricultural contracts that oﬀers this kind of discreteness.2
Instead, we measure a number of contract attributes that arguably have a relation to theoretical
constructs used by social scientists who study contracts. Second, unlike many previous studies of
contracting practices, we did not ask contractors about a speciﬁc contract. We collected data only
from the contracting side of the relationship and asked respondents either to report a statistic on
the distribution of contracts for the given commodity, or to focus on the “typical” relationship for
the given commodity. Third, we were careful to avoid asking just about “contracts” so as to avoid
nonresponse from individuals with no written or formal contract. We instead asked respondents to
“please answer the following questions for the contract (whether it be formal or informal) or advance
arrangement which is most widely used for procuring this single commodity from outside growers.”
Table 2 deﬁnes two sets of variables, one relating to characteristics of contracts and another
relating to characteristics of contracting ﬁrms. In one question, ﬁrms are asked to indicate the
2Hueth, Ligon, and Dimitri (2007) discuss shortcomings, for the purpose of conducting research on agricultural
contracting, with the distinction between “production” and “marketing” contracts that is used by the USDA for
tracking farm costs and returns.
9Table 1. Frequency Tabulation: Grower Location(s) by Commodity Group.
Commodity Group
Location(s) Annual1 Vine2 Tree3 Other4 Total
Central Coast 13 27 4 3 47
Central Valley5 9 4 8 0 21
Imperial Valley 2 0 1 0 3
Mexico 4 0 6 0 2
Multiple Locations6 43 12 9 1 65
Sacramento Valley 6 4 4 1 15
San Joaquin Valley 19 19 45 0 83
Other 39 79 20 7 145
Total 135 145 93 12 385
1Includes Anise, Asparagus, Broccoli, Cabbage, Carrot, Celery, Corn, Cucum-
ber, Drybean, Eggplant, Garlic, Ginger, Greenonion, Jailan, Lettuce, Melon,
Mushroom, Okra, Onchoy, Onion, Pea, Pepper, Potato, Pumpkin, Squash,
Sweetpotato, Tomato, Yam, Zucchini.
2Includes Apple, Apricot, Avocado, Banana, Cherry, Grapefruit, Lemon, Lime,
Nectarine, Nut, Olive, Orange, Peach, Pear, Plum, Prune, Tangerine.
3Grape, Kiwi, Winegrape.
4Alfalfa, Strawberry, Strawberryplant.
5Deﬁned as Sacramento and San Joaquin Valleys.
6Deﬁned as 3 or more locations.
proportion of total farm input that is obtained via each of the following arrangements: “grown
by my ﬁrm”, “formal contract with outside growers,” “informal contract or advance arrangement
with outside growers (e.g., handshake, or mutual understanding), or “other (please specify).” We
construct three variables from this question. First, the percentage of total farm input that is grown
in house (prctinhouse) is the response to the ﬁrst part of this question. One important consequence
of this measure in what follows is that if conveys information about the knowledge that contractors
have of the production environment of contractees. Second, we compute the ratio of the proportion
that is formally contracted to the sum of proportions of all externally procured farm input (formal,
informal, and other) and call this variable “formality.” This variable therefore measures the extent
to which the ﬁrm uses formal contracting among all contract growers. As it turns out, this variable
is strongly bi-modal. Nearly 40% of respondents report no use of formal contracting, and over 35%
report only use of formal contracts. As an alternative speciﬁcation, and to simplify multivariate
estimation of a non-linear discrete choice model, we therefore also deﬁne an indicator (formal) that
takes on the value 1, if the ﬁrm reports some use of formal contracts, and 0 otherwise. Asking ﬁrms
whether their contracs are formal is one way to assess contractual formality. We also ask whether
the ﬁrm contracts on speciﬁc measurable variables and record responses as indicators taking the
value 1 if the ﬁrm reports that it contracts on the given variable, and 0 otherwise. From these
indicators, we construct a measure of formal contractual complexity (complexity) by summing up
coded responses.
10Table 2. Variable deﬁnitions.
Variable Description
Contract Attributes
prctformal Fraction of grower contracts that are formal
formal =1 if ﬁrm uses a formal contract with some growers, =0 otherwise
contractacres =1 if typical formal contract speciﬁes acres, =0 otherwise
contractvolume =1 if typical formal contract speciﬁes volume, =0 otherwise
contractdate =1 if typical formal contract speciﬁes target delivery date, =0 other-
wise
contractquality =1 if typical formal contract adjusts payment for quality, =0 other-
wise
complexity =contactacres+contractvolume+contractdate+contractquality
implicit =1 if an implicit understanding exists that aﬀects growers’ farming
practices to some extent, 0 otherwise
oharvest =1 (low), 2, 3, 4, or 5 (high) measuring level of involvment by buyer
in scheduling harvest
harvest =1 if buyer is involved in scheduling harvest, 0 otherwise
Firm Attributes
ﬁmtype =1 if ﬁrm "obtains California farm products for the purpose of pro-
cessing or manufacturing the same and sells them in dried, canned,
extracted, fermented, distilled, frozen, or other preserved or processed
form," 0 otherwise
prctinhouse = fraction of farm input that is grown in house
ﬁrmage = years in business
ngrowers = number of growers
prctlongterm = fraction of delivering growers who have contracted with the ﬁrm
for 6 or more years
tonsbought = total tons purchased in last crop year (1e+3)
We similarly, measure informal contracting in two diﬀerent ways. First, we ask ﬁrms to report
whether there is an “implicit understanding” that aﬀects the typical grower’s behavior. Firms can
respond by indicating that (i) there is an implicit understanding, but it does not aﬀect grower
behavior; (ii)-(iv) there is an implicit understanding that aﬀects grower behavior to a small, mod-
erate, or large extent, respectively; or (v) that no explicit understanding exists because everything
is communicated explicitly. We code an indicator variable (implicit) that takes the value 1 if the
ﬁrm responds either of (ii)-(iv), and 0 otherwise. In other words, the variable “implicit” takes the
value 1 if the ﬁrm responds that there is an implicit understanding that aﬀects grower behavior in
some way, and 0 otherwise.
Second, we ask about the degree to which the ﬁrm is “involved” in scheduling harvest. We see
“involvement” as evidence of implicit contracting. Harvest timing is a key determinant of product
quantity and quality. The formal right to select harvest timing is typically left with the farmer.
There is good reason to suppose that the objectives of farmer and intermediary are not always
congruent with respect to this decision. For a given set of performance incentives, and for given
decisions made during the course of the growing season, a farmer will choose the harvest date that
maximizes his return. An intermediary who possibly faces a capacity constraint (e.g., because the
11crops of many contract growers happen to have matured on more or less the same date), may
wish to alter the “optimal” harvest dates of one or more of its growers. If the farmer is explicitly
granted authority over harvest timing, then any harvest adjustments from the farmer’s optimal date
will require that the farmer be compensated for associated losses. In practice, compensating for
losses requires a fairly precise method of determining the magnitude of yield and quality reductions
associated with suboptimal harvest timing. In most contexts, such a method does not exist.3
Although both parties to a contract may be able provide reasonable estimates of losses, it’s unlikely
that such estimates will be veriﬁable. As a result, whenever the parties’ assessments do not coincide
and an adjustment is desired, some form of bargaining will determine actual compensation paid.
To the extent that grower-intermediary relationships are on-going and exhibit “involvement” of this
sort, the relationships are “self-enforcing” in the sense that important outcomes and adjustments
are not supported by third-party enforcement.
We have already identiﬁed one ﬁrm characteristic in the percentage of farm input that is grown
in house. The other ﬁrm characteristic that is key in our analysis is whether the ﬁrm manufactures
processed food products, or whether instead the ﬁrm brokers and markets fresh produce.4 Firms
that process face a qualitatively diﬀerent coordination problem with growers than their fresh-market
counterparts. First, processors arguably have a much larger ﬁxed-cost component in handling farm
produce, and face a greater cost from coordination failure. Second, processors are concerned with a
diﬀerent set of quality indicators than fresh-market intermediaries. In particular, processing ﬁrms
are interested in the “processibility” of product for which their are indicators (e.g., size, % sugar
content, % damage) that lend themselves more easily to mechanical measurement. Fresh-market
intermediaries are interested principally in eating quality (e.g., ﬂavor, texture). As a result, fresh-
market intermediaries tend to use downstream customers’ assessment of quality to adjust grower
payments, while processors tend to use ex ante measures of product integrity.5 The ﬁrm’s age, and
the percent of growers that have long-term contracts are used to measure variation in the potential
for use of implicit contracting. It is reasonable to think that the cost of formal contracting has an
important ﬁxed-cost component. Increases in the number of growers that a ﬁrm contracts with may
make this investment worthwhile.
Table 3 provides summary statistics on key variables in aggregate and across locations and ﬁrm
types. Firms report a degree of formality that averages slightly higher than 0.5. Recall that
many ﬁrms report either all or no formal contracts with growers. Processors and producers of vine
crops report much higher use of formal contracting, the former being consistent with the aggregate
numbers reported in Figure 1. The same pattern is present for each additional measure of explicit
3The authors are aware of at least one agricultural contract in which the right to choose harvest timing is formally
allocated to the buyer, and where a specialized instrument is used to calibrate and measure losses associated with a
“suboptimal” harvest date from the grower’s perspective. This contract is an exception, however; more often ex post
bargaining is used to adjust harvest dates.
4In some instances ﬁrms reported doing both, in which case we asked ﬁrms to report on the contracts they use for
product that is marketed as fresh.
5For examples of each, see Hueth and Ligon (1999) and Hueth and Ligon (2002), which examine fresh-market
and processing tomato contracts, respectively. Processors may also have stronger incentive to invest in quality
measurement because they are unable to use residual claimancy to motivate growers. Identity preservation during
processing is generally not economically viable.
12and implicit contracting. Processors and vine-crop producers use “heavier” contracts both in terms
of their explicit and implicit provisions. Fresh-market brokers, however, have slightly higher levels
of in-house production, and vine-crop producers are among the youngest ﬁrms. Firms average about
26 growers for the given commodity, and for over half of these have relatively long-term relationships
of 6 or more years.
Table 3. Mean (S.D.) for Selected Variables by Commodity Group and
Firm Type.
Commodity Group Firm Type
Variable Annual Tree Vine Other Broker Processor Total
prctformal 0.341 0.47 0.691 0.23 0.356 0.714 0.52
(0.441) (0.468) (0.42) (0.389) (0.445) (0.389) (0.459)
complexity 1.815 1.548 2.041 1.417 1.604 2.168 1.823
(1.141) (1.147) (1.073) (0.793) (1.077) (1.102) (1.123)
implicit 0.424 0.554 0.824 0.545 0.486 0.828 0.615
(0.496) (0.5) (0.382) (0.522) (0.501) (0.379) (0.487)
oharvest 2.417 2.879 4.162 1.3 2.674 3.955 3.16
(1.73) (1.712) (1.476) (0.949) (1.783) (1.575) (1.812)
prctinhouse 0.176 0.177 0.194 0.099 0.184 0.171 0.181
(0.316) (0.287) (0.256) (0.3) (0.309) (0.25) (0.287)
ﬁrmage 0.25 0.288 0.234 0.327 0.239 0.281 0.256
(0.239) (0.259) (0.241) (0.245) (0.234) (0.265) (0.245)
ngrowers 0.176 0.453 0.244 0.13 0.249 0.283 0.264
(0.28) (0.837) (0.536) (0.139) (0.56) (0.546) (0.555)
prctlongtrm 0.581 0.568 0.462 0.529 0.543 0.505 0.53
(0.378) (0.362) (0.341) (0.399) (0.387) (0.333) (0.363)
Methodology and Results. In this section we present a series of results that explore the co-
movement of explicit and implicit contracting practices conditional on ﬁrm-speciﬁc, commodity-
group, and location control variables. We begin by focusing on two measures each of explicit and
explicit contracting. From Table 2, the variables formality and complexity measure the percentage
of contracts that are formal, and the total number of explicit provisions (from those that are listed
in the table) included in a typical contract, both for a given ﬁrm and commodity. The variable
formality is a reported statistic on the distribution of contracts for a given ﬁrm and commodity.6
Conceptually, we can think of this as an aggregation of latent variable indicators for the net beneﬁt
of formal contracting with individual growers. The variable complexity is a count of provisions for
6That this statistic is not always either 0 or 1 is evidence that (at least some) ﬁrms tailor their contracts, whether
by negotiation or not, to individual growers. Although not the focus of this paper, we asked contractors about the
extent of “customization” (one standard contract; several contracts, or a unique contract for every grower) of their
contracts to individual growers. Variation in customization is potentially interesting if it relates to variation in the
distribution of bargaining power among growers and ﬁrms. For many agricultural commodities, “adhesion” contracts
(Kessler, 1943) are the norm, and some have argued that this is evidence of market power (Hamilton, 1995)
13a given (the “typical”) contract. Measures of implicit contracting are binary (implicit) and ordered
discrete (oharvest). Each of the variables we are working with is discrete (or aggregated discrete),
and it is natural to view them all as co-determined. For simplicity we begin our analysis with a
seemingly unrelated (SUR) linear-probability model. We then consider univariate non-linear models,
and a multivariate non-linear model.
Table 4 reports SUR results without commodity-group and location controls. The positive coeﬃ-
cient on the ﬁrmtype variable indicates that ﬁrms that manufacture processed foods are much more
likely to use explicit and implicit contracting practices. A ﬁrm’s age, and the percent of growers
for a given ﬁrm that have been with the ﬁrm for 6 or more years—both measures of the potential
for implicit contracting—lead almost uniformly to less reported use of both explicit and implicit
contracting practices. Neither variable provides much explanatory power, but the results are nev-
ertheless suggestive of a relationship between repeated interaction and ﬁrms’ reported contracting
practices. Although one might expect, all else equal, that repeated interaction would lead to more
implicit contracting (and hence more reported use of implicit contracting practices), the results here
suggest less use of implicit contracting practices. One explanation could have to do with a diﬀerence
between contractual commitments that are self-enforced with an implicit contract, versus those that
are sustained through a reputational mechanism. With “trust” in a relationship, potentially there
is no need for even implicit contracting, and trust is built with repeated interaction.
Firms that grow their own farm input are more likely to use both explicit and implicit contracting
practices. This is particularly true in the case of the formality and oharvest equations. One implici-
ation of this result is that the cost of formal contracting, and the eﬃcacy of implicit contracting, are
inﬂuenced signﬁcantly by what a given contractor knows about the production environment of con-
tractees. Additionally, although there has been considerable research on the “make or buy” decision,
this result point to one beneﬁt of adopting a hybrid structure. The number of growers a ﬁrm has
also increases the use of both explicit and implicit contracting practices. As suggested earlier, we
interpret this result as evidence of there being an important ﬁxed cost component associated with
formal contracting practices. For a given beneﬁt per grower from a formal contract, the incentive to
incur this ﬁxed cost increases as a ﬁrm contracts with more growers. A complementary relationship
between explicit and implicit contracting practices then leads ﬁrms to also employ more intensive
use of implicit practices.
Table 5 reports results after adding commodity-group and location indicator to the previous
model. Qualitatively, nothing changes. The variable ﬁrmtype becomes slightly less statistically
signiﬁcant for both measures of implicit contracting, while the variable prctinhouse becomes slightly
more signiﬁcant for the formality equation. The vine-commodity indicator adds some explanatory
power for implicit contracting practices, while the tree-crop indicators adds explanatory power for
one measure of explicit contracting. Location indicators add little explanatory power across all
equations.
Among observed exogenous variables that explain variation in contracting practices, the direction
of inﬂuence is the same for both explicit and implicit practices. This suggests complementarity
between explicit and implicit contracting. There is some room for interpretation about exactly
14what the variables ﬁrmtype and prctinhouse are proxying, but it is clear that whatever forces
are at work encourage the simultaneous use of explicit and implicit practices. Table 6suggests a
similar relationship among unobserved exogenous variables that inﬂuence contract structure. The
outcome of the Bruesch-Pagan test for cross-equation independence is strongly rejected, and in all
cases the correlation is positive. With one exception, the correlations between unobservables are all
statistically signiﬁcant.
Table 4. Coeﬃcient Estimates, Base SUR Model.
Equation
Regressors formality complexity implicit oharvest
constant 0.450 1.583 0.476 2.738
(3.20) (4.51) (3.07) (5.05)
ﬁrmtype 0.365 0.466 0.344 1.300
(7.49) (3.81) (6.40) (6.91)
ﬁrmage -0.0430 -0.588 0.0314 -0.381
(-0.43) (-2.34) (0.28) (-0.98)
prctinhouse 0.275 0.340 0.216 2.171
(2.98) (1.47) (2.12) (6.11)
ngrowers 0.0889 0.369 0.0486 0.271
(2.15) (3.57) (1.07) (1.70)
prctlongtrm -0.0642 -0.231 -0.0789 -0.495
(-0.97) (-1.39) (-1.08) (-1.93)
N 306
t statistics in parentheses
 p < 0:05,  p < 0:01,  p < 0:001
15Table 5. Coeﬃcient Estimates, SUR Model with Commodity-Group and
Location Controls.
Equation
Regressors formality complexity implicit oharvest
constant 0.374 1.653 0.374 2.578
(2.45) (4.30) (2.24) (4.54)
ﬁrmtype 0.340 0.637 0.189 0.654
(5.63) (4.18) (2.85) (2.91)
ﬁrmage -0.0445 -0.606 0.0506 -0.0908
(-0.44) (-2.40) (0.46) (-0.24)
prctinhouse 0.318 0.325 0.212 2.084
(3.46) (1.40) (2.11) (6.09)
ngrowers 0.0703 0.406 0.0534 0.254
(1.69) (3.86) (1.17) (1.63)
prctlongtrm -0.0887 -0.242 -0.0379 -0.482
(-1.32) (-1.42) (-0.51) (-1.92)
Commodity Group Indicators
vine 0.0900 -0.291 0.261 1.104
(1.32) (-1.68) (3.49) (4.33)
tree 0.0214 -0.454 0.0547 0.474
(0.31) (-2.58) (0.72) (1.82)
other -0.0972 -0.463 0.0403 -1.435
(-0.57) (-1.07) (0.22) (-2.26)
Location Indicators
central valley 0.150 0.0113 -0.0259 -0.785
(1.25) (0.04) (-0.20) (-1.75)
imperial valley -0.428 -0.000589 -0.520 -1.323
(-1.46) (-0.00) (-1.62) (-1.21)
mexico -0.0577 0.0632 -0.102 -0.280
(-0.33) (0.14) (-0.53) (-0.42)
multiple locations 0.0566 0.0645 -0.0428 -0.636
(0.65) (0.29) (-0.45) (-1.95)
sacramento valley -0.227 0.254 0.207 -0.834
(-1.75) (0.77) (1.45) (-1.72)
san joaquin valley 0.134 0.0782 0.00501 -0.414
(1.55) (0.36) (0.05) (-1.29)
other -0.0126 -0.127 -0.0157 -0.518
(-0.17) (-0.68) (-0.19) (-1.88)
N 306
t statistics in parentheses
 p < 0:05,  p < 0:01,  p < 0:001
16Table 6. Correlation Matrix of Residuals from SUR Model with
Commodity-Group and Location Controls.
formality complexity implicit oharvest
formality 1.0000
complexity 0.1767 1.0000
implicit 0.1520 0.0755 1.0000
oharvest 0.3183 0.1183 0.3574 1.0000
Breusch-Pagan test of independence: chi2(6) = 92.760, p < 0.0001
 p < 0:05,  p < 0:01,  p < 0:001
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